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WETLANDS JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS
REVIEWABLE UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT IN U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS V. HAWKES
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2016, the United States Supreme Court promulgated its unanimous opinion that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
(Corps) jurisdictional determinations (JDs) are final agency actions
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 This decision not
only resolves conflicts among federal circuit courts, but also provides landowners with the ability to appeal an approved JD, an option previously unavailable to them.2
The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits “‘the discharge of any
pollutant’ without a permit into ‘navigable waters,’ which it defines,
in turn, as ‘the waters of the United States.’”3 The Corps has defined the “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) to include land
areas “occasionally or regularly saturated with water[,] such as
‘mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, [and] playa lakes’—the ‘use, degradation, or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.’”4
1. See generally United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., __ U.S. __,
136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); see also Amy Antoniolli and Daniel J. Deeb, Corps v. Hawkes:
Supreme Court Rules Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Determinations are Final and Appealable Agency Actions, NAT’L LAW REV. (June 2, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/corps-v-hawkes-supreme-court-rules-clean-water-act-jurisdictional-determinations-are (discussing disposition of case). In deciding this case, the United
States Supreme Court looked specifically to Section 704 of the APA, which states:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final
agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency
action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or
not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
5 U.S.C.S. § 704.
2. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes
Co., LEXOLOGY (June 1, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=91
26f589-80ea-45b1-8e8a-0b6e403f2c23 (noting conflicts case resolves and remedies
gained).
3. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1811 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12))
(explaining CWA prohibits discharge into “navigable waters”).
4. Id. (explaining refined definition of WOTUS used by Corps).

(147)
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The definition of WOTUS can make it difficult for landowners
to determine whether a piece of property contains such waters.
The CWA imposes both criminal and civil penalties, usually in the
form of fines, which can be substantial, making the consequences
for an inaccurate determination by landowners severe.5 Obtaining
a permit is expensive, so landowners often will not seek one if this
process can be avoided;6 still, failing to obtain a permit and being
incorrect in determining if there are WOTUS on the property can
be an additional expense.7 To help landowners determine whether
their property contains WOTUS, Corps’ regulations authorize the
issuance of JDs.8 The Corps issue these JDs on a case-by-case basis.9
There are two different types of JDs: preliminary JDs and approved
JDs.10 Preliminary JDs advise if the property contains WOTUS,
while approved JDs definitively state if the property contains
WOTUS.11 If the approved JD is positive and there are WOTUS on

5. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1319(c)-(d) (outlining penalties); see also Harmony A.
Mappes, Brian J. Paul, and Delmar R. Ehrich, Supreme Court Decides United States
Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., et al., FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS (May 31,
2016), http://www.faegrebd.com/supreme-court-decides-united-states-army-corpsof-engineers-v (outlining civil and criminal penalties); see also CWA Section 404 Enforcement Overview, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/cwa-section-404-enforcement-overview#case (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (explaining EPA’s options for
assessing fines under CWA).
Under Section 309(g), EPA can assess administrative civil penalties of up
to [sixteen thousand dollars] per day of violation, with a maximum cap of
$187,500 in any single enforcement action. [ ] The agencies also have
authority under Section 309(c) to bring criminal judicial enforcement
actions for knowingly or negligently violating Section 404.
CWA Section 404 Enforcement Overview, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/cwa-section-404-enforcement-overview#case (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).
6. Mappes, Paul, and Ehrich, supra note 5 (noting why landowners avoid
permits).
7. Id. (discussing positive and negative impacts of seeking permit); see also
CWA Section 404 Enforcement Overview, supra note 5 (giving overview of how EPA and
Corps shared authority of Section 404).
8. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 2 (explaining reasoning behind
Corps’ issuance of JDs).
9. Emily Deans and John Casey, Corps Jurisdictional Determinations Reviewable,
NE. DEV. LAW BLOG (June 15, 2016), https://www.northeastdevelopmentlaw.com/
2016/06/army-corps-jurisdictional-determinations-reviewable/ (noting case-bycase basis of JD issuance).
10. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1812 (defining two types of JDs available to landowners seeking Section 404 permits).
11. Id. (identifying two different types of JDs); Jonah Brown, United States Army
Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 0 PUB. LAND AND RESOURCES REV. 1 (2016), http://
scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss7/3/ (explaining difference between approved and preliminary JDs); see also Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 2 (noting purposes of approved and preliminary JDs).
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the property, the landowner must either seek a permit or face penalties for failing to obtain a permit.12
II. FACTS
The Respondents in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes13 are
three peat-mining companies in Minnesota that own 530 acres of
land that contain wetlands.14 Peat is widely used for soil improvement and is burned as fuel.15 To get to peat, companies drain wetlands and remove the top layer of vegetation before bringing in
machines to shave or vacuum the peat.16 In some cases, the extraction area is surrounded by earthen dikes or ditches, and pumps are
used to lower the water within the extraction area to dry the peat.17
Once dry, the peat can then be mined using excavating
equipment.18
To drain the wetland to mine for peat, Respondents needed to
receive a permit from the Corps.19 Respondents applied for a Section 404 permit for the property in December 2010.20 A Section
404 permit authorizes an individual or company to discharge
dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal
sites.21 Corps officials from the district office communicated with
the Respondents several times, both during in-person meetings and
via mail, and indicated that the permitting process would be “very
12. Brown, supra note 11, at 1-2 (noting what landowners must do if WOTUS
are found on property).
13. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct.
1807 (2016) (holding JDs final agency actions under APA).
14. Id. (explaining situation of Respondents); see also Deans and Casey, supra
note 9 (explaining status of property owners).
15. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1812 (noting uses of peat). In the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “It can also be used to provide structural support
and moisture for smooth, stable greens that leave golfers with no one to blame but
themselves for errant putts.” Id.
16. Tom Robertson, Peat could be northern Minnesota’s newest cash crop, MINN.
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 14, 2004), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2004/01/14_robertsont_peat/ (describing how peat mining works).
17. Peat Mines, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/
water/mines/peat.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (explaining how extraction of
peat is accomplished).
18. Id. (expanding on peat mining process).
19. Obtain a Permit, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://www.usace.army.mil/
Missions/Civil-Works/Regulatory-Program-and-Permits/Obtain-a-Permit/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (outlining general information on Corps’ role in Section 404
permitting).
20. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (explaining timing of Section 404 permit
request).
21. Id. (clarifying purpose of 404 permit).
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expensive and [would] take years to complete.”22 The Corps additionally informed Respondents that they would need to submit “numerous assessments of various features of the property, which
[R]espondents estimate[d] would cost more than [one hundred
thousand dollars].”23
Two years later, in 2012, the Corps issued an approved JD that
stated the wetlands on the property constituted WOTUS.24 Because
the approved JD definitively stated Hawkes’ property contained
WOTUS, Respondents applied for and ultimately received a Section 404 permit from the Corps before mining on the property in
order to comply with the CWA.25 Respondents filed an administrative appeal with the Corps, disputing the presence of WOTUS on
the property.26 The Corps’ Deputy Commanding General for Civil
and Emergency Operations sustained the appeal, concluding that
“the administrative record ‘does not support [the District’s] determination that the subject property contains jurisdictional wetlands
and waters,’ and remanding to the [d]istrict [court] ‘for reconsideration in light of this decision.’”27 On December 31, 2012, the
Corps issued a revised JD [RJD] that found a “significant nexus between the property and the Red River of the North, and advis[ed]
[Hawkes] that the [RJD] was a ‘final Corps permit decision in accordance with [Title 33, Section 331.10 of the Code of Federal Reg-

22. Id. (elaborating on conversations between Respondents and Corps); see
also Hawkes Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870-71
(D. Minn. 2013) (explaining how Corps communicated with Hawkes company representatives). At a meeting in January 2011, the parties met to discuss Hawkes
Co.’s plans for the property. Id. The Corps “attempted to dissuade [Hawkes] from
expanding their mining operations, in part by stressing the time and cost involved
in the permitting process.” Id.
23. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (noting cost and other factors Corps communicated to Respondents about project); see also Hawkes Co. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2015) (explaining Corps advised
Hawkes that assessments included hydrological and functional resource assessments and evaluations of upstream potential impacts). For more information on
how the Corps determines the existence of wetlands, see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
24. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (determining that WOTUS were present on
property). The Corps determined that the wetlands had a “significant nexus” to
the Red River, 120 miles away from the Respondents’ property. Id. See also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (discussing “significant nexus” test and origins).
25. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1001-02 (explaining failure to obtain permit would
result in knowing violation of CWA since WOTUS were found on property).
26. Id. at 996 (describing disposition of Hawkes’ appeal).
27. Id. at 998 (explaining why JD remanded back to district office).
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ulations],’ ” which [indicated] their Hawkes’ administrative
remedies were exhausted.”28
Respondents consequently sought judicial review of the RJD
under the APA.29 To determine if the RJD constituted a final
agency action, the district court utilized the two-pronged test the
Supreme Court established in Bennett v. Spear30, which outlines the
conditions that must be satisfied to constitute a final action under
the APA.31 “‘First, the action must mark the consummation of the
agency’s decision making process . . . And second, the action must
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or
from which legal consequences will flow.’”32 The district court
found the action “satisfie[d] the first Bennett condition, but not the
second [condition].”33 Hawkes easily satisfied the first prong of the
test because the RJD “would remain in place regardless of future
operations, changes in ownership, or complete inactivity on the
[p]roperty.” “The [RJD] is thus a discrete decision.”34 Addition28. Id. (noting reasons for issuance of RJD); see also 33 C.F.R. § 331.10 (2016)
(explaining administrative appeals process through Corps).
29. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (explaining disposition of case).
30. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (espousing two-prong
test for final agency actions under APA). Bennett examined a biological opinion
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) regarding an irrigation project that potentially impacted two endangered
fish. Id. The biological opinion stated the irrigation project needed minimum
water levels to protect the endangered species. Id. Petitioners claimed the FWS
action was “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA. Id. The Government argued
a claim under the APA could not be brought because the biological opinion was
not a final agency action. Id. The United States Supreme Court relied on two
prior cases to create each prong of the two-prong test in Bennett: Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (stating
“[f]irst, [ ] action must mark [ ] “consummation” of [ ] agency’s [decision-making] process”) and Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970) (stating “[ ] action must be one by which
‘rights or obligations have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences
will flow’ ”). The Court, applying these tests to the facts in Bennett, determined that
the biological opinion was a final agency action and subject to judicial review. Id.
31. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816 (noting use of Bennett test); Bennett, 520 U.S. at
154 (providing prongs of test); Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (highlighting test used
by Court in certain types of cases).
32. See Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hawkes,
136 U.S. at 1813) (outlining test set forth in Bennett). Courts frequently rely on the
Bennett test. See generally Star Enter. v. EPA, 235 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2000);
KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d
857 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
977 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.P.R. 2013); Quicken Loans, Inc. v. United States, 152 F.
Supp. 3d 938 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Pebble Ltd. P’ship v. United States EPA, 604 F.
App’x 623 (9th Cir. 2015) (highlighting reliance on Bennett test by courts).
33. Hawkes, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (outlining district court holding).
34. Id. at 874 (explaining how first Bennett prong satisfied). The district court
further noted that “[t]he only ways in which the [ ] [R]JD could be altered would
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ally, the Corps conceded that the language of the CWA regulations
describes a RJD “as ‘a Corps final agency action.[‘]”35 While not
“final for [purposes of the] APA [ ],” the Corps argued RJDs’ finality is strictly for “the public [to] rely on the determination.”36 The
district court noted that “[i]f[,] [as the Corps argued,] a [RJD] is
‘final’ in the sense the public may rely on it, the determination
must be more definitive than an advisory opinion.”37
Hawkes, however, could not satisfy the second prong of the
Bennett test that determines whether the RJD constitutes a final action under the APA.38 The district court opined that the
[RJD] does not fix [the Plaintiffs’] rights or obligations.
The [RJD] does not order Plaintiffs to take any kind of
action. Although Plaintiffs may want to obtain a permit if
they wish to expand their mining operations, the Corps
has in no way obligated them to do so. . . . Even if Plaintiffs
had never approached the Corps, Plaintiffs would have
still needed to decide whether to begin mining on a wetland possibly protected by the CWA or to pursue a
permit.39
The Corps successfully argued that Hawkes had “two other adequate ways to contest the Corps’ [RJD] in court—[by] complet[ing]
the permit process and appeal[ing] if a permit is denied, or [by]
commenc[ing] peat mining without a permit and challeng[ing] the
agency’s authority if it issues a compliance order or commences a
be if: (1) new information surfaced regarding the [p]roperty, or (2) a party later
successfully challenged jurisdiction in connection with a permit application or enforcement action.” Id.
35. Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6)) (highlighting language of regulations); see also 33 C.F.R. § c320.1(a)(6) (noting language of CWA). The regulations state, in relevant part, that
[t]he Corps has authorized its district engineers to issue formal determinations concerning the applicability of the Clean Water Act or the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 to activities or tracts of land and the applicability
of general permits or statutory exemptions to proposed activities. A determination pursuant to this authorization shall constitute a Corps final
agency action.
33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6).
36. Id. (footnote omitted) (highlighting Corps’ argument that “final” is not
final in APA terms).
37. Hawkes, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (explaining reliance makes JD definitive
action).
38. Id. at 874-75 (noting Hawkes could not show RJD determines rights or
obligations).
39. Id. at 875 (citation omitted) (explaining RJD does not control Hawkes
ability to decide whether to seek permit).
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civil enforcement action.”40 Following this analysis, the district
court held the “JD was not [a] ‘final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in court,’” and thus “dismissed [the
case] for [lack] of subject matter jurisdiction[.]”41
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit looked to the district court’s
analysis under the Bennett test and agreed that the RJD constituted
the “consummation of the Corps’ [ ] decisionmaking process[.]”42
The Eighth Circuit, however, found that the remedies for judicial
review that the Corps successfully argued to the district court were
highly inadequate.43 First, the court noted that the Corps “ignore[d] the prohibitive cost of taking either of these alternative actions to obtain judicial review of the Corps’ assertion of CWA
jurisdiction over the property [ ]” because “the permitting option is
prohibitively expensive and futile.”44 “Second, [the] other option
[available to Hawkes] . . . [to] await an enforcement action [regarding mining peat without a permit] . . . is even more plainly an inadequate remedy.”45 The court highlighted that “[b]ecause [Hawkes
was] forthright in undertaking to obtain a permit, choosing now to
ignore the [RJD] and commence peat mining without the permit it
requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA violation.”46 The
40. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1001 (outlining Corps’ successful arguments to district court).
41. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704) (quoting Hawkes, 963
F. Supp. 2d at 872, 878); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008); Coxco Realty, LLC v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16655, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2008);
Hampton Venture No. One v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 174, 175-76 (E.D. Va.
1991); St. Andrews Park, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 314 F. Supp.
2d 1238, 1244-45 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Child v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1527, 153435 (D. Utah 1994); Lotz Realty Co. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 692, 695-98 (E.D.
Va. 1990); Acquest Wehrle LLC v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409-11
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding JD is not final agency action in which judicial review is
not available).
42. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996, 999 (noting RJD was final agency action).
43. Id. at 1001-02 (elaborating on why Corps’ remedies for Hawkes deemed
insufficient).
44. Id. at 1001 (explaining options presented by Corps are highly expensive
on parties). See also Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1812 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715, 721 (2006)) (providing more information on expense of permitting).
The United States Supreme Court notes that, as cited in Rapanos, one study on
Corps’ permitting found an average applicant “spends 788 days and $271,596 in
completing the process,” without “counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”
Id. Even “general” permits took applicants, on average, 313 days and $28,915 to
complete. Id.
45. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1001 (noting why mining without permit after going
through JD process is problematic).
46. Id. (discussing penalties for failure to obtain permit); see also 33 U.S.C.S.
§ 1319(c) (outlining penalties faced by parties for knowing violations of CWA).
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Eighth Circuit thus reversed the district court’s finding, concluding
that “[an] approved JD is a final agency action [and would be] reviewable [by federal courts] under the APA.”47
III. ANALYSIS
To determine if a JD is a final agency action, the United States
Supreme Court utilized the Bennett test, which outlines the conditions that must be satisfied to constitute a final action under the
APA.48 “First, the action must mark the consummation of the
agency’s decision making process . . . And second, the action must
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or
from which legal consequences will flow.”49
The Court began its analysis by applying the first prong of the
Bennett test.50 It found that preliminary JDs do not constitute “a
consummation of an agency’s decision making process” under the
first prong of the Bennett test “because it is merely an indeterminate
conclusion.”51 Next, turning to approved JDs, the Court found that
these were, in fact, “the consummation of the Corps’ evaluation because [they] ‘definitively’ determine[d] that certain property contain[ed] jurisdictional waters.”52
The Court subsequently addressed the second prong of the
Bennett test, finding that because approved JDs are definitive in nature, “direct and appreciable legal consequences” result from
them.53 The Court further identified that “[b]oth positive and neg47. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1810 (citing United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v.
Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813-16 (2016)) (noting holding of Eighth Circuit);
Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining further procedural history).
48. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1810, 1813-14 (outlining Bennett test); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 154 (1997) (giving considerations for agency action to be
final); Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining test used by Court in certain types of
cases).
49. See Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hawkes,
136 S. Ct. at 1813) (outlining test set forth in Bennett).
50. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813-14 (giving first consideration of Bennett test);
Brown, supra note 11, at 3-4 (explaining first step in Supreme Court’s reasoning).
51. Brown, supra note 11, at 3 (citing Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813) (addressing
why preliminary JDs are not final agency actions).
52. Brown, supra note 11, at 3-4 (quoting Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813-14) (explaining why approved JDs are final agency actions). The opinion in Hawkes states
the following: “Indeed, the Corps itself describes approved JDs as ‘final agency
action[ ]’ [. . .] and specifies that an approved JD ‘will remain valid for a period of
five years[ ]’.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1(a)(6), 331.2)
(quoting Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, §1(a), p. 1 (June 14,
2005)) (explaining binding nature of JDs on Corps).
53. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1814 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bennett,
520 U.S. at 178) (noting that definitive nature satisfies second prong of Bennett
test).
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ative [approved] JDs have consequences” for landowners seeking
JDs.54 Receiving a negative JD signifies that landowners will have
less liability going forward with the permitting process because
“they will not be subject to enforcement proceedings under the
CWA for discharge into the corresponding wetlands during the established time period.”55 By receiving a negative JD, landowners
are further protected from CWA actions because “the Corps and
the [Environmental Protection Agency] EPA [have] a memorandum of agreement that binds the two agencies to a five-year safe
harbor from CWA enforcement proceedings if a negative JD is issued.”56 The Court then noted that “positive JD[s] [also have] legal
consequences as well[:] [receiving one effectively represents] a denial of protection from enforcement proceedings if the landowner
is to discharge into those waters, and a violation may subject the
owner to criminal and civil penalties if they fail to obtain a
permit.”57
Additionally, an agency action is reviewable under the APA
“only if there are no adequate alternatives to APA review in
court.”58 “[T]he Corps asserted that Respondents [in this case]
54. See Brown, supra note 11, at 4 (endnote omitted) (explaining that both
positive and negatives JDs impact landowners); see also Environmental Laboratory,
Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Manual, Wetlands Research Program Technical
Report Y-87-1 (on-line edition), U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Jan. 1987), http://
www.cpe.rutgers.edu/Wetlands/1987-Army-Corps-Wetlands-Delineation-Manual
.pdf (giving full text of technical manual Corps uses during JD process).
55. See Brown, supra note 11, at 4 (endnote omitted) (discussing consequences of negative JDs).
56. Id. (endnote omitted) (explaining protections for landowners who receive negative JDs); see also Memorandum of Agreement: Exemptions Under Section
404(F) of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandumagreement-exemptions-under-section-404f-clean-water-act (last updated Sept. 15,
2016) (outlining how EPA and Corps will determine geographic jurisdictional
scope of WOTUS for purposes of Section 404). The United States Supreme Court
notes that
[u]nder a longstanding memorandum of agreement between the Corps
and EPA, [a JD] will also be ‘binding on the Government and represent
the Government’s position in any subsequent Federal action or litigation
concerning that final determination[ ]’. A negative JD thus binds the two
agencies authorized to bring civil enforcement proceedings under the
Clean Water Act[ ] [. . .] creating a five-year safe harbor from such proceedings for a property owner.
Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting Memorandum of Agreement: Exemptions Under Section 404(F) of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-agreement-exemptions-under-section-404f-clean-water-act (last updated Sept.
15, 2016)) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2016)).
57. See Brown, supra note 11, at 4 (endnote omitted) (reflecting on consequences arising from positive JDs).
58. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704) (explaining how agency
actions are reviewable under APA).
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had two viable alternatives: discharg[e] fill material without a permit with the assumption that the land does not require a permit, or
apply for a permit and then seek review if the result [was] unsatisfactory.”59 The Court, however, did not find either of the alternatives proposed by the Corps to be viable.60 The Court explained
that “[R]espondents need not wait for enforcement proceedings
and expose themselves to steep civil penalties or criminal liabilities.
Nor should they have to apply for a permit, which [the] process
[of] can be ‘arduous, expensive, and long.’”61
IV. IMPACT
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hawkes is
touted as “a victory for landowners and project proponents who will
be able to immediately challenge an Army Corps jurisdictional determination.”62 Because the Court found there are no adequate alternatives to judicial review for JDs, those wishing to challenge one
may immediately seek review under the APA in a federal district
court.63 The Eighth Circuit espoused the importance of the immediate ability to challenge approved JDs, stating that without it, “the
impracticality of otherwise obtaining review, combined with ‘the
uncertain reach of the Clean Water Act and the draconian penalties imposed . . . leaves most property owners with little practical
alternative but to dance to the [Environmental Protection
Agency’s] [or to the United States Army Corps of Engineers’
tune].’”64 Prior to this decision, landowners who received a positive JD had three undesirable options: apply for a costly permit, pro59. Brown, supra note 11, at 4 (endnote omitted) (noting two alternatives proposed by Corps).
60. Id. (specifying proposed alternatives). The Hawkes opinion elaborates further, stating, “Respondents need not assume such risks while waiting for EPA to
‘drop the hammer’ in order to have their day in court.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815
(quoting Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012)).
61. See Mappes, Paul, and Ehrich, supra note 5 (quoting Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at
1815) (explaining why Corps alternatives were not feasible).
62. Duke K. McCall, III and Douglas A. Hastings, US Supreme Court Holds US
Army Corps Clean Water Act Determinations Reviewable, MORGAN LEWIS (June 3, 2016),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/us-supreme-court-holds-us-army-corps-cleanwater-act-determinations-reviewable (highlighting importance of decision for
landowners).
63. Mappes, Paul, and Ehrich, supra note 5 (explaining why Hawkes has positive impact on landowners).
64. Hawkes Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002
(8th Cir. 2015) (discussing why judicial review of JDs is imperative). The Eighth
Circuit further added that “[i]n a nation that values due process, not to mention
private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” Id.
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ceed without one and risk civil and criminal penalties, or abandon a
project altogether.65
While landowners and companies applauded the decision in
Hawkes, environmentalists and scholars have questioned whether
the decision weakens the CWA.66 For example, property rights proponents condemn the permit process as tedious and expensive,
sometimes to the point that property owners withdraw their plans
to apply for a permit from the Corps.67 A wetland policy expert at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison stated, “The Corps will say
that’s the process working — the permit compensating for the impacts.”68 Because the permit application process is so onerous,
landowners are forced to think about the implications of their proposed projects and the construction processes used to complete
them.69 Now that the United States Supreme Court determined
that JDs can be challenged in court, more companies may try to
overturn Corps’ JDs of which waters should be protected and which
should not, impacting the balance environmentalists see between
the permitting process and completed projects.70
As a result of Hawkes, lawyers in the field believe that more
litigation over the scope of the CWA will soon follow.71 Hawkes
65. McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (noting decision making process landowners went through before Hawkes). For more on the cost of permitting, see
supra note 44 and accompanying text, as well as infra note 67 and accompanying
text. Following Hawkes, landowners can now claim that under the APA, the agency
action (the JD) is:
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required
by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of Title 5 (Government Organization and Employees)
of the United States Code or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the
extend that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
66. Tara Golshan, This Supreme Court decision has the potential to weaken the Clean
Water Act, VOX (May 31, 2016, 10:32 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/31/
11656624/united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-vs-hawkes-clean-water-act-supreme-court (exploring whether decision effectively weakens protections of CWA).
67. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (discussing how Supreme Court
noted average applicant for individual permit in 2002 spent 788 days and $271,596
to complete application process).
68. See Golshan, supra note 66 (noting deterrent of expense of permitting
process).
69. Id. (explaining difficulty of permitting process).
70. Id. (noting Hawkes has opened up ability for companies to challenge
JDs).
71. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (explaining implications of Supreme Court decision on future litigation); see also Golshan, supra note 66 (noting

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6

158 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII: p. 147
opens the door not only to legal challenges by landowners with positive JDs, but also to environmental groups or other parties that
seek judicial review of negative JDs.72
The Corps responded to Hawkes in October 2016 with a regulatory guidance letter (RGL), explaining the difference between approved and preliminary JDs.73 The RGL explains:
[A] definitive, official determination from the Corps that
there are, or that there are not, jurisdictional aquatic resources on a parcel and the identification of the geographic limits of jurisdictional aquatic resources on a
parcel can only be made by means of an [approved JD].74
The RGL states that any individual who wishes to obtain a JD
must specifically request it from the Corps.75 The Corps “will then
work with the requestor to determine what form of JD will best
serve his or her needs.”76 The RGL lists several factors that Corps
employees should consider, including the “requestor’s preference
and reasons for the request, whether a permit authorization is associated with the request and the characteristics of any proposed activity needing authorization.”77 The RGL notes that the Corps’
district engineer has the sole discretion to issue a JD.78 The RGL
directs the district engineer to reasonably prioritize requests based
on “the district’s workload and available regulatory resources,” and
advises that district engineers may give JD requests accompanied by
decision opens door for more companies to try and overturn Corps’ determinations); see also Taylor Pitts, The Clean Water Act Is Under Fire And It’s Threatening Your
Lineup, STORMWATERONE (June 2, 2016), http://stormwaterone.com/articles/theclean-water-act-is-under-fire-and-its-threatening-your-lineup-the-inertia (speculating more people may be willing to contest Corps determinations); see also Daniel
Fisher, Supreme Court Hands Big Win To Landowners In Wetlands see also Challenges,
FORBES (May 31, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2016/05/31/supreme-court-says-landowners-can-sue-over-wetlands-determinations/#16b34b482617 (surmising increase in litigation as result of Hawkes).
72. See Golshan, supra note 66 (noting future challenges to Corps’ JDs); see
also McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (discussing nature of future cases regarding JDs).
73. Elizabeth Corey and Heather M. Palmer, Army Corps Issues Regulatory Guidance Letter on Jurisdictional Determinations, NAT’L LAW REV. (Nov. 2, 2016), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/army-corps-issues-regulatory-guidance-letter-jurisdictional-determinations (explaining Corps’ issuance of regulatory guidance
letter).
74. Id. (notes role of approved JD).
75. Id. (explaining that approved JDs must specifically be sought from Corps).
76. Id. (outlining process for seeking approved JD).
77. Id. (listing factors to be considered for determining type of JD needed).
78. Corey and Palmer, supra note 73 (noting ultimate discretion of Corps district engineer).
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permit requests higher priority.79 It is still unclear, however,
whether the heightened prospect of judicial review will make the
process for obtaining approved JDs more onerous.80
Legal scholars also rightly speculate that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case suggests that several justices
would be willing to revisit the Court’s precedent on CWA jurisdictional issues if a future challenge to the Army Corps’ or EPA’s jurisdiction went before the United States Supreme Court.81 In Hawkes,
Justice Anthony Kennedy stated that the CWA is “‘notoriously unclear’” and that it “continues to raise troubling questions regarding
the [g]overnment’s power to cast doubt on the full use and enjoyment of private property throughout the Nation.”82 Since the
United States Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v.
United States83, uncertainties about the jurisdictional reach of CWA
persist.84 Rapanos consisted of consolidated cases involving four
Michigan wetlands located near ditches or man-made drains that
eventually emptied into “traditional navigable waters.”85 Rapanos
resulted in several decisions with different reasoning from the Supreme Court: Justice Antonin Scalia authored the plurality opinion,
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Kennedy authored concurrences, while Justice John Stevens and Justice Stephen Breyer authored dissents.86
Because Rapanos provided no rationale that a majority of the
justices supported, lower courts were “extracting different rules and
decisions,” prompting the EPA and the Corps to publish new rules
defining what they considered to be WOTUS.87 In May 2015, the
79. Id. (outlining further discretion Corps district engineer possesses).
80. Id. (highlighting unanswered questions post-Hawkes).
81. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (noting Supreme Court’s apparent
willingness to revisit CWA jurisdictional issues).
82. See United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., __ U.S. __, 136 S.
Ct. 1807, 1816-17 (2016); see also McCall and Hastings, supra note 62 (discussing
CWA’s ambiguities).
83. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 719 (2006) (discussing regulation
of wetlands under CWA).
84. The Supreme Court Holds that Army Corps’ Jurisdictional Determinations are Final Actions Subject to Judicial Review, JACKSON WALKER, https://www.jw.com/tag/
united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-v-hawkes-co/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (exploring problems in CWA jurisdiction since plurality in Rapanos).
85. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (discussing nature of consolidated cases).
86. Id. at 715 (describing resulting opinions and aftermath).
87. Robert Meltz and Claudia Copeland, The Wetlands Coverage of the Clean
Water Act (CWA): Rapanos and Beyond, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 3,
2014), http://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/files/legreg/documents/CRSWetlands
Coverage.pdf (discussing confusion created by plurality opinion in Rapanos in
lower courts).
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EPA, the Corps, and the Obama administration announced the
Clean Water Rule (CWR), designed to “provide the clarity . . . about
which waters are protected by the [CWA].”88 The primary goals of
the new CWR are to “minimiz[e] delays and costs, mak[e] protection of clean water more effective, and improve[e] predictability
and consistency for landowners and regulated entities.”89 The new
rule, however, continues to generate significant controversy;90
states, industry groups, and environmental interest groups immediately filed challenges, all contending that “the rule either went too
far or not far enough.”91 There is currently a nationwide stay
against enforcement of the CWR by the Sixth Circuit.92 Due to confusion as to whether the cases should be heard in federal district or
federal appellate courts, and potential inconsistencies with the
holding in Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit believed a stay was necessary
to

88. Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s water war, POLITICO (updated May 28, 2015,
2:56 pm), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule118319 (explaining purpose of Clean Water Rule).
89. Clean Water Rule, 80 FED. REG. 37,057 (highlighting goal of Clean Water
Rule).
90. Susan Hori, New ‘Waters of the US’ Rule on Hold: Enduring Debate Creates Uncertainty for Developers, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2015/12/14/new-waters-of-the-us-rule-on-hold-enduringdebate-creates-uncertainty-for-developers/#ixzz3wa5ahchO (discussing intended
and unintended extent of Clean Water Rule).
91. Id.; see also Whitney Forman-Cook, Twelve Lawsuits brought against EPA’s
Clean Water Rule to be heard together, AGRI-PULSE (July 31, 2015), http://www.agripulse.com/Twelve-lawsuits-brought-against-EPAs-Clean-Water-Rule-to-be-heard-together-07312015.asp (explaining twelve different challenges filed, and have since
been consolidated by Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation and randomly assigned to Sixth Circuit). “Groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) called for more pollution
protections, while other industry leaders, like Murray Energy Corp and the American Farm Bureau Federation, wanted narrower rules that will not interfere with
business operations.” Id; see also Barry M. Hartman, Tad J. Macfarlan, and Ankur
K. Tohan, Clean Water Rule Stayed Nationwide, K&L GATES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://
www.klgates.com/clean-water-rule-stayed-nationwide-10-14-2015/ (explaining reasons and history of Sixth Circuit stay).
Shortly thereafter, a coalition of 18 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin) filed motions with the Court seeking (1) a stay
of the rule during the pendency of the court’s proceedings and (2) a
ruling from the Sixth Circuit that it lacked jurisdiction to hear their appeals (enabling pursuit of their cases before the district courts).
Id.
92. See generally Bebe Raupe, Sixth Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Water Rule,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bna.com/sixth-circuit-hears-n57982
064762/ (giving background on Sixth Circuit’s stay of Clean Water Rule).
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“‘temporarily silence[. . .] the whirlwind of confusion that
springs from uncertainty about the requirements of the
new Rule and whether they will survive legal testing[,]’
‘honor[ ] the policy of cooperative federalism that informs the Clean Water Act[,]’ and ‘restore uniformity of
regulation under the familiar, [. . .] pre-Rule regime,
pending judicial review.’”93
The United States Supreme Court will inevitably address CWA
issues in the near future, whether the case comes from the Sixth
Circuit on certiorari, or in the form of an APA challenge to a Corps
JD, but any decision made will inevitably impact landowners, environmentalists, and government agencies alike.94
Emily R. Paulus*
93. Hartman, Macfarlan, and Tohan, supra note 91 (explaining reasoning behind stay by Sixth Circuit). For more information on the Clean Water Rule and
the Sixth Circuit’s stay, see In re Environmental Protection Agency and Department
of Defense Final Rule; “Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United
States,” 80 FED. REG. 37,054 (June 29, 2015), Nos. 15-3799/3822/3853/3887 (6th
Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) (giving full text of Sixth Circuit case and Clean Water Rule).
94. See Supreme Court Holds that Army Corps’ Jurisdictional Determinations are Final
Actions, supra note 84 (musing about future of CWA and Clean Water Rule in Supreme Court); see also Justin Jennewine, Sixth Circuit Agrees to Hear Challenge to Clean
Water Act, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/sixth-circuit-agrees-to-hear-challenge-to-cleanwater-act/ (explaining Sixth Circuit’s decision to grant itself jurisdiction over
Clean Water Rule).
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
B.A., 2014, Muhlenberg College.
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